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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In times such as these when science is the god to 
whom the age pays homage, it is pro£itable to have some 
knowledge o£ a philosopher whose metaphysical ponderings 
were an attempt to establish a middle course along which 
science and metaphysics could travel. Since "science seeks 
to describe in terms o£ the phenomenal",l it is well to dis-
cuss a philosophical system which helps to give depth and 
breadth to the con£ined sphere o£ the scientist and which 
bolsters science with a rational basis. 
Francis Suarez made just such an attempt through-
out his £amous philosophical treatise, Disputationes Meta-
physicae. More than any or the scholastics be£ore him, he 
strove to strengthen his scheme o£ thought by use of empir-
ical £acts. What success he obtained by this novel mode of 
procedure may be decided from these words or an eminent 
Suarezian scholar. In an interesting article on the Meta-
physics or suarez, while treating of the Doctor's theory o£ 
i------.---Fulton J. Sheen. Philosopr: of Science. The Bruce Publish-
ing Co., Milwaukee, 1934, • --
1 
cognition, this author says: 
Another great thesis flowing direct-
ly from this central doctrine of 
creaturehood is Suarez's position 
on cognition. This doctrine is of 
paramount importance for the present 
day because it represents the one 
serious gesture which scholasticism 
has made to join hands with science.2 
2 
The prime purpose and definite end ot this thesis, 
therefore, is a study of Suarez's concept of prime matter, 
the ultimate material cause of things, and the rejection of 
Suarez's concept as a safe middle course. A brief history 
of the problem of change which comprises the views of the 
more important philosophers both ancient and scholastic, 
is thought to be the logical approach to the entire dis-
cussion. Such an approach gives the reader a broader and 
more comprehensive view of the subject. Under a separate 
heading Suarez' position will be brought to light. In 
this section some stress will be placed on his concept of 
entitative act which is essential to prime matter according 
to his metaphysical reasoning. Herein lies his point of 
departure from the traditional teaching of Aristotle and the 
Angelic Doctor. 
Through a critical analysis of this entitative 
2-H~t;r-Guthrie. "The Metaphysics of SuarezV Thought. 
June, 1941, 297. 
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act it is hoped that its nature and its function will be clear-
ly de£ined. Reductively, it leads to an admission o£ compo-
sition in the essence of prime matter. From this it wiil be 
£urther concluded that, since prime matter has composition in 
its very essence, being cannot be considered as a substantial 
unity but merely an accidental aggregation of complete sub-
stances. 
The conclusion of this thesis will but reiterate 
the findings of chapter four, but with this important addition: 
The influence of Nominalism on the metaphysics of Suarez will 
be pointed out in order to add weight to the conclusion that 
being cannot be anything but an accidental composite if en-
titative act is permitted metaphysical validity. With the 
Nominalists Suarez denied the real distinction between essence 
and existence, thereby forcing himself by way of a corollary 
to postulate entitative act £or prime matter. Furthermore, 
his approach to metaphysical problems was highly empirical, 
and from an empiricist's point of view prime matter must 
possess some degree of perfection. This degree of perfection 
is the entitative act which leaves prime matter with essential 
composition, and gives rise once more to the dilemma of Par-
menides. 
This chapter can now be brought to a close with a 
4 
statement of the central point towards which the thesis is 
directed: What is this entitative act of Suarez and what is 
its metaphysical validity as an essential constituent of 
prime matter' 
CHAPTER II 
A HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM 
It has been deemed advisab1e, before beginning 
any analysis or Suarez's position on the essence or prime 
matter, to set down by way or a history of the p)roblem, 
what same or the more important thinkers who attacked the 
problem before Suarez, thought on this poiht and what con-
clusions they reached. This procedure will give a clearer 
picture or the subject as a whole, and will make subsequent 
analysis much easier. 
The crux of the whole problem lay in the famous 
dilemma of Parmenides, who was the first to give lasting 
impetus to the perplexing enigma of change. His denial 
or change of any kind and his adherence to a monistic and 
materialistic concept of being followed directly tram his 
theory of cognition which can be stated in the following 
terms: "idem est cogitare et esae". 1 Unlike Berkeley's 
principle, that of Parmenides sets forth the complete in-
telligibility of being which, however, was joined with 
y-H;;;;~-Diels. Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker. I 
Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin, 1934, Parmenides, 
No. 3. 231. 
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perfect imaginability, making the being with which he dealt, 
sensible being. 
From this principle of cognition is immediately 
deduced his first metaphysical principle, "ens est, non-ens 
non est",2 which implies wdthin its scope, that being, since 
it is sensible, exists in its fulness, but a vacuum, which 
according to Par.menides is non-being, does not exist. 
Furthermore, since being does not differ from 
being by reason of being, and since being cannot be dif-
ferentiated by reason of non-being(which is not), Par.menides 
was forced to conclude that being was absolutely and une-
quivocally one. From this premise he is led to declare 
that the actual multiplicity of being along with the poten-
tial multiplicity is utterly absurd, and an illusion of 
the senses .3 
Why must the mutability of Parmenides's monistic 
being be denied? Change would imply that something new would 
result. But this change, according to the famous Parmenidean 
dilemma which Aristotle formulates in his Physics~ is 1m-
~-.----------3 ~., Nos. 2,6. 231, 232. 
Ibid. 
4 Aristotle. Physics. The Works ofAristotle. Translated 
under the editorship of W.D. Ross, M.A., Oxford at the 
Clarendon Press, 1928, I, 8, 19la, 23 - 24. 
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possible. The dilemma is sufficient proof for the utter 
impossibility of change: "aut fieret ex ente aut ex non-ente; 
ex ente autem fieri non poteet. hoc enim jam est; sed nee 
ex non-ente; ex nihilo nihil fit"~ Therefore being as it 
is found is the one and only possible thing. Nothing new 
can be had; nor can what is already had• be in any way 
changed. 
If the second horn of the dilemma be considered 
in relation to the purely corporeal world in which creation 
in the strict sense plays no part. then it is obviously 
true that. "ex nihilo nihil fit". The first half of the 
dilemma. a finding consequent upon the metaphysics of Par-
menidea, is also true if being and non-being are contra-
dictorly opposed. as Par.menides expressly states. In fact 
not only must the multiplicity of being be denied. but also 
intrinsic change of any kind whatsoever. 
Par.menides and his followers went even further in 
their far-reaching denial of local motion. What was there 
in the idea of local motion that was not in agreement with 
their metaphysics? According to their way of viewing the 
problem. local motion postulated the existence of a vacuum. 
But, as has already been stated. a vacuum which is non-being 
is utterly absurd. Therefore the local motion which de-
5-~~~-~--~~ 
Diels. No. 8. 236. 
• 
mands this vacuum is equally preposterous.6 
Examined in the light of Parmenidean metaphysics~ 
mere numerical division of indivisible beings was found 
wanting and so~ rejected. The reasons for this rejection 
are as follows: division would imply change and being is 
immutable; division supposes that all the parts of the 
being divided would be actuated simultaneously and so could 
be dissolved into parts which had no extension; finally 
division would require a vacuum which does not and cannot 
exist.7 
Parmenides~ therefore, on metaphysical grounds 
argues to the unicity and absolute immutability of being. 
Since his conclusions are the result of intellectual cog-
nition and since the senses seem to contradict the data 
presented by the intellect, he denies the veracity of these 
gates to the outside world. However, in spite of the errors 
he championed, he did leave to those who followed him a 
problem which could be solved only on metaphysical grounds. 
Unless the solution were metaphysical, and not purely em-
pirical, as was that of Diogenes who attempted to solve the 
problem of local motion by merely walking~ the dilemma 
would remain untouched, and leave to puzzled posterity an 
~-----------7 ~., 238. 
~., 237. 
8 
apparent contradiction between metaphysical and sense cog-
nition. Therefore a theory which purposed to save the 
appearances of things was necessary. Such was the solution 
offered by the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus. 
Leucippus and Democritus, though staunch defenders 
of the doctrine of Par.menides, wanted so to apply his prin-
ciples that the conflict between intellectual and sense 
perceptions would be allayed. In the supremely mechanical 
system they p;ropounded the material cause of all things 
9· 
was made up of an infinite number of indivisible atoms, which 
were similar and of the same nature. So far, the Atomists 
are of one mind with Par.menides. Change, substantial and 
accidental, corruption or generation, was wrought by vari-
ations in the position, figure, or relationship of the atoms. 
All mutation in being could be explained with the help of 
the vacuum, non-being, which, according to Leucippus and 
Democritus, •non minus existit quam ens". As can be seen, 
this was decidedly a radical departure from the first prin-
ciples of Parmenides. However, the Atomists were of the 
opinion that if the vacuum were introduced, the gap between 
the world that is perceived by the senses and that which is 
perceived by the intellect, would be bridged.8 
Multiplicity was the first type of change which 
e-~ld::-II, Leucippus and Democritus. No. 156. 174, 175. 
10 
this theory or the Atomists was to save. Through the medium 
or the vacuum would be had ideal conditione ror the inri-
nite and actual multiplication or being. Yet these multi-
plied beings would retain the unicity and indivisibility 
which Parmenides ~edicated or his being. They woulld be 
extrinsecally and intrins!cally incapable or change; though 
extended~ they would be indivisible; for from two, one 
could not be had; nor two from one. The metaphysics of 
Parmenides excluded any such possibility. 
Local motion in the vacuum was to be the solution 
for the apparent multipliability of being, and consequently, 
would account for generation and corruption. The former 
would be brought about by an orderly arrangement of the 
atoms; the latter, by disorder among the infinite parti-
cles. Yet, as must be insisted, all this corporeal activi-
ty was merely apparent. Nothing became; being remained 
9 
unchangeable. 
Subsequent philosophers endeavored to give great-
er cogency to the position assumed by Parmenides and the 
Atomists, or they allied themselves to principles diametri-
cally opposed. To the former belonged Zeno and Melissus 
who went to great lenghts in order to advance convincing 
proofs which would demonstrate the metaphysical tenets of 
g---.------Ibid. 
-
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Parmenides. Zeno, indirectly proposed proofs which had for 
their theme local motion, which he totally rejected, since 
he considered it an illusion of the fallible senses. Melis-
sus, his contemporary, attempted the same thing, with this 
exception- Melissus's method was more direct. The conclu-
sions at which he arrived were the same as those reached by 
Zeno. However, he did add one new note to the idea of being 
which cannot be found in the teachings of either Par.menides 
or Zeno. Being as conceived by Melissus was infinite. But 
by this it would seem that he meant infinity in a sense in 
which it was not used in later philosophical systems. His 
infinity was one which belonged to magnitude. His final 
conclusions, however, were those of Parmenides: Being is 
immutable and one.10 
The school of Greek thought which set out to dis-
prove the doctrines of Parmenides, had for its chief ex-
ponent, Heraclitus, whose fundamental thesis was: "Nothing 
is; all is becomingn.ll According to this principle, which 
he claimed to be the result of much intellectual labor, 
things are in a constant state of flux. They are constantly 
being evolved from the first material by a process of con-
ft)--------~., I, Melissus, No. 1. 268. , 
ll Ibid., Heraclitus, No. 91. 171. •lao Plato. Crat~lus. 
1rito. (Loeb Classical Library). Translated by H •• 
Fowler. London: William Heinemann. 1926, 402a. 
12 
denaation, or are returning to it by rarefaction. 
What is the first matter with which Heraclitus 
was concerned? According to him it was a subtle substance, 
etheral and invisible, which partook of the nature of fire. 
Further, it was intelligent and living.12 Hence it was not 
only the world-body, but also the world-soul. It was a god 
of some sort which governed the world, while at the same 
time it gave the universe ita bulk or mass. Though intelli-
gent, it was not free. Blind and inexorable necessity 
ruled it.13 
While little can be said 1n behalf of the theory 
of Heraclitus, since it left the first part of Par.menides's 
dilemma unsolved, two points are worthy of note. In the 
first place, 
Heraclitus did not conceive the prim-
ordial fire as a mere mass of matter 
shaped into various accidental forms 
(mechanistic monism), but as an all 
pervading reason operating by its own 
power(dynamism), according to fatal-
istic necessity, forming bodies that 
differ essentially (pluralism), and 
reducinf these again to its own sub-
stance. 4 
The other point which merits attention is the 
12----~---~ 
13 Diels. No. 113. 176. Ibid. , No. 90. 171. 
14 PiUl J. Glenn, Ph.D. Historz £!Philosophy. B. Herder 
Book Co. St. Louis Mo. l934 53. 
13 
deep and lasting influence Heraclitus had on those who 
followed him. It is especially noticeable in Plato's ideas 
on prime matter and the problem of change. As has been 
said, his theory was in itself of little value as a solu-
tion to the enigma, but it did show one thing: a theory 
which would explain the dilemma and would contradict neither 
metaphysics nor sense cognition, had to be found. In 
other words Heraclitus put the question more directly and 
in a manner that was a challenge. 
Before going on to the true solution of the whole 
problem of change, a few words on the teaching of Plato 
would not be am~ss. To decide precisely what Plato's views 
on this subject were, is no easy task. At times it seems 
that the problem was not entirely clear to Plato himself. 
That he had ideas about the essence of prime matter is 
evident from his works; but these ideas were subject to 
change without notice. 
In general, it can be said that Platonic prime 
matter was a determined substance of a sort15 •hich in some 
way came under the influence of the world-soul. Corporeal 
bodies were made up of earth and fire, the former g1ving 
solidity, the latter, light and heat. These two elements 
Is--------Plato. Timaeus. Plato. (Loeb Classical Library) Trans-
lated by R.G.Bury, Litt.D. London: William Heinemann, 
1929 48aff. Sla. 
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had nothing in common, and so demanded two further elements, 
air and water, that they might fuse and give a new sub-
stance. 
Now ir the first two elements are ultimately com-
posed of prime matter, as he says they are,l6 why have they 
not at least this as a common substratum whiCh will form a 
basis for fusion? Why is it necessary to have recourse to 
two other elements which are equally diverse? Plato him-
self realized the haziness of his concept of prime matter. 
In the Timaeusl7 he tells us that it is known by a sort of 
spurious reason and that it is something scarcely to be con-
sidered a matter 2f belief. In this, some inkling or Plato's 
difficulty is to be found. He realized that a principle 
of limitation and a substratum of change was required, but 
such a principle as finally formulated by Aristotle, was 
out of gear with Plato's first principles and with a system 
that was idealistic.l8 Here again another philosopher tries 
to solve the problem of change, and still another was left 
hanging on the first horn of the dilemma: "ex ente non fit 
ens". 
It was not until the time of Aristotle that a 
is-i~~~:--30a, 35a. 17 _, 
18 ~., 52b. 
Glenn. 55, 56. 
15 
theory of being was formulated and presented which satis-
fied the exigencies of metaphysics and natural sense phe-
nomena. This was the famous doctrine of Potency and Act. 
Between the two extremes of the Parmenidean being and the 
Heraclitean "becoming" Aristotle placed his tertium quid, 
potency, which merely said that being already existing had 
the capacity to acquire further perfections which it did not 
possess. From this principle he could explain the phenomena 
which for centuries had troubled the philosophers. By apply-
ing this general principle of Potency and Act to natural 
bodies he was able to account for change on metaphysical 
grounds. He argued somewhat in this manner: All bodies 
have something within them, common to all, by reason of which 
they are bodies; they have some principle or substratum 
which makes them bodies. What is this common element? 
Aristotle said that, 
Matter, in the most proper sense of 
the term, is to be identified.with 
the substratum which is representa-
tive ~~ coming-to-be and passing-
away. 
From other texts of his, various generic and specific descrip-
tions of the material cause of all things can be culled. In 
the Metaphysics he describes matter thus: 
i9-A;l;t~tle. De Generatione !i Corruptione. The Works of 
Aristotle. Translated under the editorship of W.D. Ross, 
M.A., Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1928, I, 4, 320a,. 2. 
By matter I mean that which in it-
self is neither a particular thing 
nor of a certain quantity nor assign-
ed to any other of the categories by 
which being is deter.mined.20 
In the Physics is found the following: 
For my definition of matter 1a just 
this- the primary substratum at 
each thing, from which it comes to 
be without qualificatioft1 and which persists in the result. 
Appealing to an analogy Aristotle further enlarges upon 
his notion of prime matter. 
For· as bronze is to the statue, the 
wood to the bed, or the matter and 
the formless before receiving form, 
so is the underlying nature to the 
substance, i.e. to the this of ex-
istent.22 - - ----
Prime matter, therefore,is a medium between 
being and non-being; it is not absolute nothing because 
every natural body has prime matter as an essential part 
of itself. 
Our doctrine is that although 
there is a matter of the percept-
20--~~---~ Aristotle. Metaphysics. Translated under the editor-
ship of W.D. Ross, M.A., Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 
1928, VII, 3, 1029a, 20. 
21 Aristotle. Physics. I, 9, 192a, 31. 22 Ibid., 7, 19la, 32. 
ible bodies (a matter out of which 
the so-called "elements" come to be), 
it has no separate existence, but is 
always bound up with the contrariety.23 
17 
In other and more familiar words, the matter for its existence 
requires the form which specifies the matter, !·~· which dis-
tinguishes one body from another. Of itself matter is utter-
ly passive; all activity comes to it through the form. 
For to begin with, 
istic of matter to 
i.e. to be moved; 
to-act, belongs to 
'power•.24 
it is character-
suffer action, 
but to move, !·~· 
a different 
Or it can be more briefly expressed: "As to the 'matter' it 
(qua matter) is passiven.25 
With certain reservations Aristotle goes so far as 
to class prime matter as a substance, understanding always 
that it is an incomplete substance and a co-principle of 
being. When he does call it substance, there is always at 
least implied the notion of ttpoten-tial". 
The substratum is a substance,and 
this is in one sense the matter 
(and by matter I mean that which, 
not being a 'this' actually, is a 
'this' potentially.)26 
~~-A;i;t~tle. De Generatione ~ Corruptione. II, 5, 329a, 24. 
25 Ibid., 9, 3350, 29. 
26 Ibid., a, 324b. 1a. Aristotle. Metaphysics. VII, 2, l042a, 23. 
18 
It is the stui'f from which, through union with the substan-
tial for.m, the composite becomes; and for almost the same 
reason, prime matter, which of itself is incorporeal, is 
spoken of by Aristotle as a potential nature. 
Prime matter is one because it is the substratum 
or tirst subject of all change. As Aristotle says: 
It is therefore better to suppose 
that in all instances of coming-
to-be matter is inseparable, being 
numerically identical and one with 
the 'containing' body, though in-
separable from it by definition.27 
Prime matter is unchangeable because, 
--- we have stated that the sub-
stratum is the material cause of 
the continuous occurence of com-
ing-to-be, because it is such as 
to change from contrary to con-
trary and because, in substances, 
the coming-to-be of one thing i• 
always the passing-away of another, 
and the passing-away of one thing 
is always another's coming-to-be.28 
Prime matter is pure potency and not pre-determined to re-
ceive this form rather than that. "As to the matter, it 
(~matter) is passive".29 In itself it is absolutel¥ in-
deter.minate; its sole function is to form the substantial 
~~ Aristotle. ~ Generatione ~ Corruptione. I, 5, 320b, 12. 
~., I, 3, 319a, 15. 
29 Ibid., I, B, 324b, 18. 
19 
substratum of all bodies and to be the basis of change with-
out ever being changed. Aristotle brings out this idea of 
prime matter being pure potencty in his famous description. l 
By matter I mean that which in it-
self is neither a particular thing 
or of a certain quantity nor assign-
ed to any other of the categories by 
which being is determined.30 
It is real but by no means actual. To become actuated it is 
necessary that it receive the substantial form for which it 
has an essential attraction. 
The truth is that what desires the 
form is the matter, as the female 
desires the male, and the ugly the 
beautifu1- only the female or the 
ugly not per ~ but per accidensvl 
So much for Aristotle's doctrine •. It is very im-
portant, in view of what will be said of Suarez's notions of 
prime matter, to note what Aristotle lays down as its essence. 
He iasists on its being pure potency and on its being in-
determinate. Otherwise there would be no complete solution 
of the problem of change. Philosophers prior to Aristotle's 
time failed to solve the problem precisely because they were 
ignorant of the idea of pure potency. For them there were 
two extremes: being and non-being; from neither could 
30 Aristotle. Metaphysics. Vll, 3, l029a, 20. 
31 Aristotle. Ph i I 9 192 20 ys cs. , , a, • 
20 
being be derived. With Aristotle's clear notion of a prime 
matter which was an incomplete being and which of itself was 
totally indeter.mined, change could be explained. Being in 
potency is capable of receiving any form whatsoever in its 
own order. In the case of generation and corruption in the 
wide sense, the result of the change is substantial which it 
would not be if prime matter were in any way determined by 
its very nature. Any union with prime matter already deter-
mined would ba merely accidental, thereby admitting no fun-
damental and complete explanation of the problem of change. 
As will be seen, this is Suarez's point of departure from the 
teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas. 
With Aristotle's doctrine on this subject presented 
more or less clearly, little need be said of the teaching of 
St. Thomas, since he merely reiterates Aristotle's theory. 
For him all being which is subject to change is composed of 
potency and act. Bodies were composed of matter and form. 
Prime matter is pure potency and has no existence apart from 
the substantial form. 
In the system of philosophy and theology which has 
come to be known as the Thomistic system, the Aristotelian 
principle of potency 
32-st:-Th~mas. Summa 
77, art. 1. ad 2. 
and act along with the notions of matter 
Theologica.I, q. 66, art. 1. ad 3. q. 
q. l5, art. 3, ad 3. 
21 
and form, and essence and existence, were more widely applied 
by St. Thomas than by Aristotle himself. Nevertheless, the 
principles remain basically the same, and they alone offer 
the true metaphysical solution to the Parmen1dean puzzle. 
r 
CHAPTER III 
SUAREZ'S DOCTRINE ON PRIME MATTER 
Now that aome tamiliari ty with the problem ot 
change as a whole haa been achieved, a non-contentious dis-
cussion ot Suarez's position regarding this problem is pos-
sible. Since there are many points on which he was in com-
plete accord with Aristotle and St. Thomas, these will be 
treated briefly, that time and consideration may be given 
to those ideas ot his whiCh show divergences trom the common-
ly accepted opinions ot Thomas and Aristotle.. The discrepan-
cies in the two schools ot thought will beoome evident in 
the latter part of this chapter which deals with the reality 
ot prime matter. 
If Suarez's notions of matter are to receive the 
comprenen.ion they deserve, it is necessary, as a preliminary 
step, to bear caref'ully in mind his denial of the real dis-
tinction between essence and existence. On this single prin-
ciple hinges Suarez's postulate of the ent1tat1ve act in 
prime matter. The logic in the postulate 1a evident. If 
essence and existence are identical, then in the essential 
order prime matter, though considered as pure potency in 
22 
23 
relation to the informing act, cannot be without some act 
which will give it reali t}" independently of this informing 
act. Various citations from the Disputationes Metaphysicae 
show bey-ond the shadow of a doubt that he held and defend-
ed a logical distinction between essence and existence.l 
However much Suarez may- have differed with Aristotle 
on certain de.f'ini te phases of the problem, he had no fault 
to find w1 th the theory of matter and form in 1 ts broader 
aspects. In fact upto a certain point there is not the 
slightest note of' discord. In the beginning of his treatise 
on prime matter Suarez's chief concern is to prove that there 
is euch a thing as a basic material cause of all things. 
His arguments tor ita existence, though long and searching 
are all reducible to one head, substantial change in living 
substances. Presc1nding trom ita nature and the form which 
it :may receive, Suarez finds that such a thing as prime 
:matter is as evident aa the substantial changes which are 
constant occurrences within the experiences of' everyone~ As 
can be seen at a glance, this statement is based on empiri-
cal observations rather than on any metaphysical exigency. 
1-R:;:-p;~cisci Suarez e Societat Jesu. Opira Omnia. Editio 
Nova. Par1a1is: Apud Ludovicum Vives, Bib iopolsm Editorem, 
1856, Disputationea Metaphzsicae. Disp. XXXI, Sect. 6, n. 
2 23. also Dlap. XV, Sect. 9, No. 5. Ibid.,Disp. XIII, Sect. l, No. 4. 
-
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However, tram these a.pirical facta Suarez is easily able to 
transfer his line of argumentation into the realm of meta-
physics, and produce a proof whiCh carries conviction. Argu-
ing from the repugnance the intellect .finds in explaining 
anything by recourae to an inf'inite aeries, he deftl7 shows 
tnat prime matter is not only the basis of all change, but 
also the ultimate basis. 
Igitur vel illud subjectum sup-
ponit aliud aubjectum vel non, 
si non suppon1t, illud est pri-
mum et habetur intentum. Si 
vero suppon1t aliud, quaeram 
de illo; est autem evidens non 
posse procedi in infinitum; ergo 
necessario sistendum est in ali-
quo prSmo subjecto seu materia 
prima. 
•· 
If any further proof is needed to make this argument con-
clusive, it can be readil7 found b7 considering other forms 
of change, such as generation, corruption, and nutrition. 
Den7 an ultimate basis of change and these everyday phenom-
ena will have to be attributed to nothing leas than creation 
and annihilation; an explanation as repugnant to metaphysics 
as it is to ordinary experience.4 
As an immediate corDllary from what has been said, 
Suarez is easily able to prove that there is but ~ first 
3-Ibld::-io. 4. 4-' Ibid., Nos. 51 8. 
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material cause. Again his reasoning flows :from the impossi-
bility ot an infinite series, but this time the principle is 
considered :from a different angle. This constant regression 
is out ot the question because in the series one would be 
faced with a procession of mutually dependent subjects of 
change. Furthermore, these dependent subjects are composed 
and can be further resolved into simple substrata. With 
metaphysical necessity a wholly independent and simple sub-
ject must be reached and this is prime matter.5 
From this it is but a simple step to conclude to 
the tact that primordial matter is a simple substance. So 
after refuting Thales and those ancients who taugnt that 
prime matter was something integral, and after rejecting the 
forma corporeitatia of Scotua and Henry ot anent, Suarez 
takes sides with Aristotle in defending the aimpllci ty of 
matter.6 
So tar Suarez has explained, "quid non sit materia, 
quam quid sit0 • 7 Now he feels himself to be in a position to 
take up the positive and more contentious side of the problem. 
It is at this juncture that the force ot his denial ot the 
real distinction makes itself felt. Granted the necessity 5 .. _._,__,.. ______ 
Ibid., lfo. 10. 
s- Sect. 3, No. s. Ibid., 7-!,2!2.., Sect. 4. No. 1. 
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of identifying essence and existence, some kind of act must 
be given to prime matter. Suarez's mode of argumentation 
will help to throw light on this statement before this Chap-
ter is ended. 
Suarez open3 this section with a consideration of 
those facts in the case upon which there is mutual agreement. 
From Aristotle's Metaphysics and other works, he shows that 
the material cause of things joined to the substantial fo:rm 
has true reality, and that it is really distinct from the 
form.B Matter must have reality or real entity; otherwise 
it would be nothing. Matter must have reality of itself 
because of the part it plays in the generation and corruption 
of substances. If it had no reality of its own, change 
would be nothing more or less than creation and annih1lation.9 
Furthermore thi~eality must be substantial reality. The 
reasons for this are obvious. A complete substance cau be 
made up only of substantial parts. But prime matter is a co-
part of every natural substance. Therefore it is a substan-
tial reality. But matter, besides being a substantial part 
8-ut-;;;~-ab his, quae certa videntur, incipiamus, primo 
indubitatum esse videtur, materiam, quae actu est sub 
forma, et cum illa compon1 t substantiam corpoream, habere 
aliquid entitatis realis et substantialia, et realiter 
9 distinctae ab entitate formae. ~., Sect.4, No. 2. ~.,No. 3. 
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of the complete substance, adds something to the compos! te; 
and this something is substantial, not accidental.lO So 
argues Suarez, and since he is discussing an uncontroverted 
point, nothing further need be added by way of comment. 
In conclusion to all this he asserts that matter 
must be really distinct from the form, "quia materia est 
entitas realiter separabilis a qualibet forma particular! 
determinata, quod satis est ut a forma sit in re ipsa d1stinc-
ta".ll This distinction between mattS.. and form, since the 
form. is not a mode, ia a real distinction. D1atinguitur ergo 
materia a forma tamquam rea a ren.l2 
Now Suarez is ready to venture forth alone and give 
his answer to the question, "an materia ex ae habeat aliquam 
entitatem actualem?" 13 He is tully cognizant of the difficul-
ties of his position and the criticism to whiCh he is expos-
ing himself. Yet he positively asserts: 
••• materia prima ex se et 
non intrinaece a forma habet 
auam entitatem actualem 
essentiae, quamv1s non habeat 
1llam, nisi cum 1ntrinseca habi-
tud1ne ad formam.l4 
10 ___ ._ ___ _ 
ll Ibid., No. 4. 
12 Ibid., Ho. 5. 1 nmr. 1~ Ibid., No. a. ~., No. 9. 
r 
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suarez insists that he ia here using the terminology of his 
adversaries lest controversy should arise. How a difference 
ot ppinion is at all possible is beyond him! Matter as 
found in the composite must have a real essence if it is to 
retain its title as a real being.l5 Nor can it have this 
reality from the actuating for.m. For for.m can give essential 
entity to a nature only when it is the"act of a real passive 
potency., in union with which it forms a composite. Therefore 
not the potentiality but the composite is the term of the 
form's causality. Consequently., the essential reality of 
matter cannot be communicated to it by the form; for prime 
matter is essentially a simple entity like its form., and the 
primary composition results from the conjunction of the two.l6 
Further confirmation can be gathered if it is remembered that 
every simple entity is of itself constituted in its own 
essential nature. No intervention of another entity can 
bring this about. If it were otherwise., there would be noth-
ing to distinguish it from the eomposite.l7 
Suarez's next argument is based on the incomplete 
nature of the l}laterial cause and the fact that such a nature 
cannot be intrinsi3eally derived from the form. To his mind 
it is valid and conclusive: 
is-ibid:--
16 Ibid. 
17-Ibid. 
-
r 
' 
• 
••• quia ai formam includeret, 
nihil illi deesset ad ratione.m 
completae essentiae. 'l'andem 
ex ipsa ratione purae potentiae, 
hoc ipsum colligitur; nam si 
materia haberet suum esse essen-
t1ae 1ntr1nsece per formam, in 
suo essential! conceptu 1nclu-
deret aetum formae, non ut 1n-
tr1naecum terminum, seu add1tum, 
sed ut 1ntr1nsecum actum forma-
lam cons t1 tuentem, at que non 
esset pura potent1a.lB 
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Although prime matter has its own reality indepen-
dently of the form, Suarez is most insistent that it does not 
have this reality without a transcendental relation to the 
form, "quia essentialiter est potentia", and in the words of 
Aristotle is, "primum subjectum".l9 His argument is based 
on the intrinsic relationship which exists between potency 
and act. This relationship is not to some specific form, 
but to form in general. In matter the forms may vary in pro-
portion to the changes which occur, but the intrinsic relation 
which matter has to form never changes. Furthermore, the 
fact that this relationship never changes is but a fUrther 
vindication of the thesis that matter does not get its es-
sential reality through a union with the substantial form. 
Since this argument is so important, it is here given in fUll. 
18 .. ____ .,. __ _ 
omnia potentia dicit 1ntrinsecam 
hab1tud1nam ad suum actum; pro-
19 llli.· Ibid., No. 11. 
prius autem actus materiae est 
forma; habet ergo materia suam 
propriam essentiam per seipsam 
cum habi tudine ad formam. Haec 
autem habitude non est per se 
primo ad hanc vel illam formam, 
sed ad formam absolute, et con-
sequenter ad quamcumque formam 
generabilam, -seu quae per gen-
eratione.m uniri possit, et ideo 
quamvis in materia varientur 
formae, non variatur essentialis 
ratio vel habitude materiae. ~od 
$t1am est clarum argumentum mate-
riam non habere entitatem essentiae 
ab informatione formae.20 
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Suarez now sets out to reconcile his doctrine on 
the essence of prime matter with Aristotle's teaching that it 
is pure potency. At first glance the two positions seem ir-
reconcilable. Suarez thinks not. For him the crux of the 
difficulty lies in a proper interpretation of "pure potency". 
According to Thomas ao4 the Thomists, matter is pure potency, 
"Quia neque ex se neque in se habet ullam existentiam nisi 
per formam.n21 Capreolus, Socinus, and Javellus are cited 
as opponents of this theory. Scotus and Henry of Ghent, oa 
the other hand,are of the opinion that there is a twofold 
kind of act, formal and entitative. In their writings, 
_.., __ .... _ .. __ 
Materiam docent ex se habere ac-
tum entitativum, non tamen forma-
lam, et consequenter aiunt mater!-
20 Ibid.· 
21-Ibid., Sect. 5, No. 2. 
r 
am vocari puram potentiam in or-
dine ad actum formale.m, non vero 
in ordine ad actum entitativum. 22 
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Following Scotus and Henry of Ghent, Suarez incor-
porates this entitative act into his concept of prime matter. 
Going even fUrther, he makes bold to state that the concept 
is not at all foreign to Aristotle. How does he justify this 
assertion? Act is the correlative of potency. Now there 
must be as many types of act as there are of potency. He 
enumerates three: passive, active, and logical, but excludes 
active as having no bearing on the question. Bow a thing 
may be thought of as in act with respect to receptive potency, 
and also merely with respect to objective potency. Matter, 
therefore, though pure potency with reference to informing 
acts, is not mere objective potency and so must be said to 
be in act, or to have its own entitative act. 
Materia ergo prima, quamvis sit 
prima pura potentia receptiva, at-
que ita in sua essentia nullum in-
cludat actum formalem, quod signi-
ficatur per istud vocabulum, pura, 
nihilominus postquam creata est, non 
poteet dici in pura potentia objec-
tiva~ ergo hac ratione recte dici-
tur esse vel habere actum entitati-
vum.23 
However, a mere assertion that the idea, "pure potency", does 
no.t:.uclude every act is not sufficient unless there be con-
~~--.......... .. 
23 ~~i&·· No. 9 • 
• , Bo. 4. 
vincing evidence for the contention. Suarez offers the 
following:. 
Primo quia materia prtma in 
conceptu essential! poteet 
intelligi ex genera et dif.fer-
entia composita; ut, verbi 
gratia,si materia coeli et 
horum inferiorum distingu-
untur specie, haec materia 
de qua nunc agimus, non 
stat genera materiae in com-
muni et propria differentia, 
quae sumt poteet ex ordine 
ad .formam entia generabilis; 
habet ergo materia suum ac-
tum for.malem metaphysic~, 
quo ~n suo esaentia oonat1-
tu1tur.24 
The gist of this proof can be given briefly. For genus the 
earthly bodies can be considered as having certain matter 
common to both earthly and celestial bodies, and for differ-
ence, its relation to the form of a corruptible body. From 
this, matter of itself can be said to have its own metaphys-
ical act. 
This last argument gains greater force, according 
to Suarez, if the following line of reasoning is taken into 
consideration. Matter o.f itself has some perfection and 
goodness which belong to it regardless of the form. Suarez 
states his position in the following manner: 
24 !E,!2.., No. 9. 
Et confirmatur, nam materia na-
tura sua ali<pam perfectionem 
et bonitatam transcendentalem 
habet, ••• Certum est, enim, 
compositum ex materia et for-
ma, perfectius quid esse quam 
sit sola forma; ergo aliquid 
perfectionis habet materia, 
quam addi t compos! to. Itam 
ipsa materia est appetibilis 
et conveniens, non tantum ut 
medium, sed per se, quia rati-
one suae perfectionis est con-
veniens huic formae vel compos-
ito; ergo habet materia ex na-
tura sua ali~am propriam perfec-
tionam; sed non potest intelligi 
perfectio sine actualitatis aliqua, 
saltem transcendentali.25 
From all this reasoning 1 t can be concluded that 
matter is pure potency in relation to the informing act, 
because suCh a concept is not included in the formal concept. 
However, it cannot be said that, "materia prima ita est pura 
potentia, ut excludat omnem actum metaphysicum actuante.m". 
Whether or not all this ratiocination brings Suarez's theory 
of prime matter into line with that of Aristotle, may still 
be a doubtfUl issue for some, but not for Suarez. Aristotle 
may state in express and open terms that prime matter is 
something entirely without form. For Suarez this causes not 
the slightest hesitation • 
••• per haec autam et s1milia 
dicta solum excluditur a mate-
ria amnia actus formalis et com-25 ______ ,.. ... _. 
Ibid., No. 10. 
ple.tus, non vero actus enti tati-
vus, incompletus, et quasi inco-
hatus, sine quo realis potentia 
receptiva esse non potest.26 
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Thus we have briefly sketched the more important 
ideas whiCh Suarez conceived of the essence of prime matter. 
Most important ofJthese ideas for the purpose of this thesis 
are those notions on the actuality of matter considered by 
itself. It is here that Suarez sets himself' apart from his 
master, Aristotle, as well as from the Angel of the Schools, 
St. Thomas. All else he has to say on prime matter has its 
roots in that one notion: Matter has of itself and indepen-
dentl7 of the form, something ot reality. 
Yet in this he is but being logically loyal to his 
first principles, and particularly to his denial of the real 
distinction between essence and existence. That Suarez has 
been logical, there is little doubt; that he is correct is 
another question. This question we shall now attempt to 
answer in the following chapter which will be a critical 
analysis of the Suarezian position. 
~s· .... -.... --
~., No. 13. Also Aristotle. Phzsics. I, 9, l92a, 20. 
CHAPTER IV 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SUAREZ'S DOCTRINE 
This chapter purposes to analyze critically and 
evaluate a series of objections which Suarez proposes after 
his treatise on prime matter as pure potency. While the ob-
jections themselves merely anticipate the obvious attack an 
adversary would make against the Suarezian doctrine and con-
cept of matter, and offer no particular difficulty in under-
standing, the answers given are of interest as well as of 
importance. In these is to be gained a clearer knowledge of 
Suarez's position and of the metaphysical difficulties to 
' 
which it leads. Furthermore, it is hoped that this analysis 
will likewise show, or aid in showing, that the entitative 
act in prime matter as conceived by the Doctor Eximius, if 
pushed to its logical extremities, leaves all metaphysical 
explanations of change in the same unhappy pass Par.menides 
found them.l 
Why should Suarez's theory of prime matter cause 
this reversion to the Par.menidean dilemma? This question 
can best be answered by a statement of his position. Either 
Suarez's theory of prime matter is the same as that of !_.., ______ __ 
Chapter II, 1, 2. 
35 
36 
Aristotle or it is different. From what has been said in the 
preceeding chapter, it is obvious that Suarez was propound-
ing a system that was a radical departure from the tradition-
al view.2 But if the Suarezian system is different, then this 
entitative act is act in the strict sense of the term as used 
by the scholastics. Otherwise ehtitative act would be a 
modus loquendi,and would affect th~ essence of prime matter 
not at all. However since the system is different, this act 
is act strictly interpreted. It can be concluded, therefore, 
that prime matter is composed of essence and existence. In 
other words matter is the complete being Parmenides said it 
was, and not the incomplete being postulated by ~istotle 
and the scholastics. The analysis which now follows will 
help, by specific examples, to make this deduction clearer 
and more concrete. 
~1e first difficulty which Suarez proposes is word-
ed as follows: 
Prima, quia absque esse nullus est 
actus, quia nihil habet actualita-
tem nisi in quantum est, et ideo 
ipsum esse est actualitas omnium 
rerum, ••• ; sed materia non habet 
esse, nisi per for.mas ••• ; ergo.3 
What precisely is the state of the question? The adversary ________ .. _ 
2 Chapter III, 20,21. 
3 Suarez. Disputationes Metaphysicae. Disp. XIII, Sect. 5, 
No. 16. 
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is saying that without existence there is no act. However, 
matter has no existence except through its form. Therefore 
matter has no act of itself. 
Although Suarez's handling of the objection is 
brief,it is sufficient to deepen one's insight into the 
Suarezian concept of prime matter. Before analyzing the re-
sponse which is based on an interpretative exposition of the 
scholastic principle, ~~!§!A FORMA, the answer as 
given by Suarez will be quoted. 
Omne esse est a forma duobis modis 
exprimi poteet. Primo, de esse spe-
cifico et completo. Secundo, quod 
omne esse est a forma, vel intrinsece 
dante et componente illud, vel sal-
tam ter.minante aliquo modo dependen-
tiam ejus, et hoc modo ipsum esse 
dici potest esse a forma, quatenus 
ab illa pendet ••• 4 
For the sake of greater clarity the formal distinc-
tion which Father Harper makes in his treatment of this same 
objection will here be given in summary fashion. In sub-
stance it is the same as Suarez's answer, but put in lan-
guage which is more readily understood. 
Harper's response centers around the notion of 
being which is absolute and complete, and being which is in-
complete. Applying these notions to the difficulty of the 
----~-----4 ~., No. 17. 
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adversary, he finds that it would be a valid objection if it 
etates that without existence coming from the form, there is 
no act complete or incomplete, absolute or dependent. How-
ever, if the adversary wishes to imply, (and he does) that 
without existence coming from the form there is no incomplete 
and dependent act, then the objection must be denied. Prime 
matter, he says, can and does have incomplete and dep.endent 
act.5 
While this response can be attacked on several 
scores, facility in handling it seems to demand that the ex-
amination be restricted to a discussion of incomplete and 
dependent act. St. Thomas, following Aristotle, considered 
prime matter as incomplete being. In the terms of the school, 
it ·is an ~ quo, as opposed to the composite which is an 
.!!!!! quod. This !!!.! quo, prime matter, was pure potency, 6 
capable or receiving any form decided upon by the efficient 
cause. In itself, it could not determine: it could only be 
5-T,h;-M;J~r must be distinguished. There is no entitative 
act without being, either absolute and complete or incom-
plete and dependent,-- granted; absolute and complete 
on1y,-- denied. The Minor is contradistinguished. The 
form gives absolute and complete entity or being to Matter,-
granted; incomplete and dependent,-- there is room for a 
subdistinction: It gives being by reducing the potentiality 
to act,-- granted; it gives being in the sense that it 
communicates to Matter the special imperfect entity of the 
latter,-- denied. (Thomas Harper, S.J. The Metaphysics £! 
~School. II. Peter Smith, New York, 1881, 267.) 
6 St • Thomas. ~ Spiritualibus Creaturis. art. 1. 
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determined. Alone, it c.ould neither exist nor be known.? 
For both, another incomplete being, another !a! quo, the ror.m, 
was required. Setting aside the cognoscibility of prime 
.matter, it might be added that St. Thomas went so far as to 
say that even by divine omnipotence, matter could not exist 
without the for.m.a Why did Aristotle, and st. Thomas after 
him, go to so much bother to stress the absolute potentiality 
of prime matter? As was said in chapter two9, any solution 
which was to give the lie to Par.menides's dilemma had to be 
a metaphysical solution, which was natural enough since the 
whole problem was founded on a metaphysical basis. As can 
be easily recalled, being was one for the great Eleatic, and 
from being which was already one,.being could not be produced. 
Aristotle's tertium iuidlO between complete being and noth-
ing was being in potency. 
Would entitative act give birth again to this dis-
turbing Par.menidean dilemma? As was stated in the beginning 
of this chapter, Suarez considered his teaching on the es-
sence of prime matter to be different from that of St. Thomas 
and Aristotle. His divergence from his predecessors is found 
.. ---... ~------
7 St. Thomas. In I Phys. lect. 
8 St. Thomas. Summa Theologica. 
quodl. q. 1, art. 1. i0chapter II. 4. ~.,a. 
13·. 
I, q. 7, art. 2, ad 3. 
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in this concept of entitative act whiCh is not a mere modus 
loquendi. If it were, Suarez's notions on prime matter 
would differ in no way from the theory of Aristotle and St. 
Thomas. Therefore, it must be act in the strict scholastic 
sense of the tel'Jil... Then prime matter has essential com-
position and consequently, must be complete being. Finally, 
if it is complete being, it cannot be the substratum of 
change, and Parmenides 1 s problem remains unsolved. 
An analysis of the act itself will bring this into 
clearer focus. It is, according to Suarez, as much a part 
of prime matter as the substantial form is of the composite.ll 
Yet, although act, it does not destroy the incomplete nature 
of prime matter. It does not prevent matter from being pure 
potency.l2 In short, it seems to be act and not to be act, 
which is an obvious contradiction. Now if it is act and 
metaphysically required by prime matter, matter has composi-
tion and so is logically reduced to complete being, an ~ 
quod. Union with the substantial form would demand a sub-
stantial change which in turn would demand another substratum 
to serve as the basis of change, or leave the union of 
matter and form a mere accidental aggregate. 
This conclusion seems to be metaphysically valid. 
_____ .. ___ _ 
ll Ibid., 17, 18, 19. 
12 ~., 21. 
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On metaphysical grounds a first subject which is the substra-
tum of change, while remaining unchanged, must be had. Fur-
thermore, some metaphysical principle which differentiates 
one being from another is required. This is the form or the 
act. Since prime matter is the first subject and is pure 
potency capable of receiving all forms, it, as such, has ab-
solutely no need for act or form. To give it act of any 
kind implies a contradiction and disrupts the metaphysical 
explanation which is the one solution to Parmenides's di-
lemma. 
The next objection which Suarez offers against his 
doctrine claims that his theory makes of prime matter an ac-
tual entity~ This actual entity would be united with a sec-
ond actual entity, the form, thereby destroying the possibil-
ity of substantial union and making of the composite, not an 
~ Eer .!!,, but an~ per accidens. Though this has been 
mentioned above in passing, it will be here considered more 
fully. In the words of Suarez the objection is put thus: 
----------13 Suarez. 
Secunda, quia alias ex materia 
et forma non fieret per se unum, 
quia ex duobis entibus in actu 
non fit unum per se; ideo enim 
ex subjecto et accidente non fit 
unum per se, quia aliud est esse 
subject!, aliud accidentis.l3 
Disputationes Metaphysicae. Sect. 5, No. 16. 
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Suarez answers as before by explaining another famous scho-
lastic dictum: 
Ex duobis entibus in actu non 
fit unum per se non potest in-
telligi de quibuscumque entita-
tibus actualibus: nam potius 
est impossibile ens per se ac 
completum actu componi nisi ex 
entibus incompletis; nam quod 
nihil est, ut saepe diximus, 
non potest ~ealiter componere, 
et praesertim ens per se unum. 
Debet ergo intelligi de entibus 
in actu completis in suis gener-
ibus; illa enim nee per se ordi-
nantur, nee recte cohaerent ad 
compoaendum unum per se. Non 
dicimus autem materiam esse hoc 
modo ens actu, sed potius dici-
mus esse veluti quandam incoha-
tionem entia, quae naturaliter 
inclinatur, et per se conjungi-
tur formae ut complenti integrum 
ens.l4 
Suarez's answer is rather long and not altogether 
to the point. In brief, he states that prime matter and sub-
stantial for.m are two incomplete and dependent entities, not 
two complete and independent realities. Yet he does not 
dispose of the main point of the difficulty, the entitative 
act in prime matter. It can be granted that matter is, "quan-
dam incohationem entia, quae naturaliter inclinatur, et per 
se conjungitur for.mae ut complenti integrum ens", but the 
14-~~~~::-No. 17. 
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main question remains unanswered. If this entitative act is 
true act and is found in prime matter, how can prime matter 
be an incomplete being? Again, there seems to be had the 
basis for a contradiction. Matter has its own act, yet it 
is an incomplete substance. Matter has its own act, yet it 
can be united with the form in such a way that the resulting 
composite is a substantial unit. The too obvious conclus-
ion here is that Suarez's concept of prime matter leaves the 
problem of change in the same curious position in which Par-
menides found it when he first established his monistic 
theory of being. 
The third objection further elucidates the mani-
fest contradiction apparent in Suarez's notions on prime 
matter. The difficulty takes its roots in the simplicity, 
a negative simplicity it is true, which Aristotle and the 
scholastics p~edicated of prime matter. If matter is simple, 
it must be exclusive of all act. Any kind of act implies 
composition and so destroys the note of simplicity in matter. 
The objection as found in the Disputationes Metaphysicae 
takes the following form: 
Tertia, materia est omnino sim-
plex; ergo vel tota est actus, 
vel tota potentia, quia simplex 
entitas non potest constare ex 
actu et potentia physicis. Sed 
non potest dici quod tota est 
actus, cum essentialiter sit 
potentia; ergo est omnino 
potentia nihil includens actus.l5 
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In answer to this Suarez hinges his refutation on 
the real identity he claims for essence and existence. From 
this principle which is at the root of his idea of matter, a 
fact which has already been mentioned in chapter two, he 
argues: 
••• materiam totam esse poten-
tiam et totam esse actum, qua-
lem nos explicuimus, non per 
compositionem actus potentia, 
sed per identitatem, et (ut ita 
dicam) per intimam et transcen-
dentalem inclusionem; non enim 
omnia potentia opponitur omni 
actui, sed cum proportione, po-
tentia igitur recpptiva non 
opponitur actui entitativo in-
completo, sed potius illum es-
sentialiter 1ncludit.l6 
This response to a very fundamental difficulty 
seems to be a begging of the quest~on. Rather, Suarez goes 
back to explain the relationship that exists between the 
various potencies and their acts; and ends by asserting that 
potency essentially includes entitative act. What is the 
core of the objection? It proposes a complete disjunction: 
prime matter is either pure potency or it is pure act. 
~~----~-~-iR Ibid., No. 16. 
Ibid., No. 18. 
45 
According to Suarez's theory neither member of this disjunc-
tion can stand. Since no one favors the latter part, atten-
tion can be centered on the first. How can matter have this 
act and still be, "omnino simplex"? Suarez gives no answer. 
According to him essence and existence are identical. There-
fore matter must have existence. If this be admitted, the 
same contradiction is evidenced that was pointed out in the 
two preceeding objections. Matter is entirely simple, yet it 
has act. Matter is pure potency which implies total absence 
of act, yet it has its own entitative act. Carry this out 
further and it must be concluded that matter is not simple, 
but composite, and being comes from being which is a further 
contradiction. 
The fourth objection follows as a subsumption from 
the one treated above. Based on the opposition which exists 
between pure potency and pure act, it procedes as follows: 
i7--~---~-
Quarta, quia purus actus ita est 
actus, ut nihil habeat admistum 
potentialitatem, seu potentiam 
receptivam; ergo e contrario 
pura potentia ita est potentia 
ut nihil habeat actualitatis 
admistum; nam oppositorum 
eadem est ratio; et quia pura 
potentia debet summe distare a 
summo actu; non distaret summe 
si ali~uid actualitatis inclu-
deret. 7 
~., No. 17. 
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Suarez's refutation demands a few words of explana-
tion lest the gist should be lost. It would seem that he 
intends in this instance, to exclude Infinite Being from his 
consideration and confine himself to finite act. Now finite 
act does not exclude active potentiality; nor indeed all 
entitative potentiality. A fortiori it does not exclude all 
metaphysical potency, which is essentially included in the 
contingency of its being. What it does exclude is a passive 
potentiality. In like manner, .pure subjective and passive 
potency does not exclude entitative act. How could it avoid 
being but a mere concept of the mind if' 1 t did? 'What it does 
exclude, as w~s stated before, is all actuating or informing 
act.lB 
The refutation to the objection runs along the 
same lines as the answers to the three that have gone before. 
Everything is granted the adversaries, except the denial of 
entitative act. Pure potency has nothing of actuating or 
informing act included in it, but it does have entitative 
act. Otherwise, it would be nothing. Its one and only 
claim to reality is derived from this entitative act. 
Suarez cannot understand how it could be otherwise. 
If prime matter were being in the strict sense of 
18 ~., No. 19. 
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the term, Suarez's stand might be tenable. But according to 
the Aristotelian concept, it cannot be being in the strict 
sense. As Aristotle conceived it, prime matter is being in 
an analogous sense only. It is being in potency; it is a 
principle of being; it is the subject from which complete 
being is derived. In other words, prime matter does not 
have being in the same sense as the composite has it. Only 
by rational deduction and analogy is this difficult concept 
reached. Deduction also shows that it must be incomplete 
being, and incomplete being in such a way that act of any 
kind not only is not necessary, but utterly impossible if 
the problem of change is to be explained metaphysically. 
The conclusion to these observations must be the 
same one that has been drawn from the answers to the last 
three objections. The Suarezian concept of prime matter 
carries with it contradictions of such a nature that the 
system can hardly be used as an adequate solution to the 
problem of change. Indeed, it is feared that this solution 
reduces the problem of change to the statement of Parmeni-
des: "ex ente non fit ens". 
There is a fifth and final objection which we in-
tend to examine. The gist of the difficulty is that if 
there is act in prime matter, then prime matter is sub-
stance in the strict sense, or it is an accident. In the 
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words of the great Doctor himself the objection reads as 
follows: 
Quinta, quia materia aliquid est 
actu, ergo vel substantia vel ac-
cidens; non secundum ut per se 
constat; neque primum, quia est 
potentia ad substantiam; quod 
autem est potentia ad aliquid,non 
est actu illudmet, nam duo repugnat 
haec.l9 
In the answer to this Suarez says: 
Ad quintam respondetur, materiam 
esse substantiam. • • Unde materia 
non est potentia ad totam latitudi-
nem substantiae, sed ad formam et 
ad esse compositi; ad substantial-
em autem entitatem materiae non est 
in potentia, sed actu est talis en-
titas. Repugnat enim dari potentiam 
realem et receptivam respectu totius 
generis et latitudinis substantiae, 
ut completam et incompletam compTe-
hendit, quia substantia prior est 
accidente; et ideo talis potentia, 
cum sit pr~ subjectum, non potest 
esse accidens sed substantia; neque 
etiam potest esse in potentia ad se-
ipsum; ergo nee potest esse in poten-
tia ad totam latitudinem substantiae.20 
This objection, if the first member be considered, 
has force against Suarez's position and further shows the 
precariousness of a theory that demands entitative act in 
----------19 ~., No. 16. 
20 ~., No. 20. 
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the first subject and material cause of all things. Falling 
back upon Aristotle's principles which have validity in 
Suarez's eyes, the mind finds it difficult to conceive of a 
pure potency which has some act. Therefore, it finds dif-
ficulty in not conceiving a pure potency with entitative 
act as anything but a substance, in fact as a complete sub-
staace. 
Pushing this notion of prime matter and its cog-
noscibility a bit further, we can question Suarez's idea of 
what is meant by "pure potency". He says that prime matter 
has a potency for the form. Appealing to Aristotle through 
Father Hoenen, one can better say: 
Materia est potentia ens sim-
pliciter, quod ulterius determin-
ari debet ad esse simpliciter, 
sive substantiale, i.e. ad esse 
primum, ~ .!!2!!, .!,!! aliquid quod 
habet potentiam, sed ipsa est E2-
tentia ad esse simpliciter:z! 
In other words Suarez makes a very subtle distinction be-
tween matter as pure potency and matter in pure potency. 
For him they are not the same. With Aristotle he maintains 
that "pure potency" looks only to the informing act; while 
"in pure potency" is considered an incorrect way of speak-
21 Peter Hoenen, S.J. Cosmologia. Roma, 1936, 277. Also 
Aristotle. Metaphysics. IV, 4, l007b, 28. 
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ing if by it one int.ends to exclude from matter all actual-
ity.22 By such a process of reasoning it would seem that 
Suarez, in fact though not in theory, is denying a very 
fundamental thesis of the scholastic system, subjective 
passive potency.23 He adheres faithfully to the traditional 
terms, but reductively, he seems to be treating only of 
logical potency.24 Had he done otherwise and handled his 
study of prime matter in the traditional manner, both in 
theory and in fact, he would not have been forced to pos-
tulate this entitative act. Without this entitative act 
he would not open his theory to the same censure that has 
been put upon so many of the explanations of change given 
after the time of Parmenides. Finally he would not have had 
an ~ quod, and would not have endangered the validity of 
his metaphysics by incorporating into his theory of prime 
matter contradictions which renew the age-old dilemma of 
Parmenides. 
~~-S~;;;;: Disputationes Metaphysicae. Sect. 9, No. 13. 
L. Mahieu. Suarez,~ Philosophie. Paris, 1921, 282. 
24 P.G.M. Manser. Das-Wesen Des Thomismus. F.Rutschi, 
Freiburg (SchweiZT; l935, 606. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
After the preceding discussion and argumentation 
it is now possible to draw some conclusions from Suarez's 
teachings on the essence of prime matter as well as from his 
philosophy in general. That his concept of prime matter is 
one that is at variance with the doctrine of Aristotle and St. 
Thomas is a fact that can hardly be controverted.l Beyond 
controversy, too, is his point of departure from the tenets 
of the Aristotelian and Thomistic school. As has often been 
repeated in this paper, Aristotle and Thomas taught that 
prime matter was pure potency devoid of any act, while Suarez 
postulated for it what he is pleased to call entitative act. 
This entitative act upon which Suarez builds his 
notions of prime matter was not a concept. unheard of prior to 
his time. Long before, it had made its appearance in the 
writings of philosophers of great repute and of repute not so 
great. Scotus, Henry of Ghent, Ockam, Gregory of Rimini, 
Durandus, and Gabriel Biel, to mention but a few, were staunch 
l Fridericus Saintonge, S.J. Summa Cosmolofia. Imprimerie 
Du Messager, Montreal, 1941, 370. Also • DeRaeymaeker. 
MetaEhisica Generalis. Apud E. Warny, Lovanii, 1936, 314-
316. 
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defenders of the entitative act, if not in name, certain~y in 
idea. That Suarez came directly under the influence of all 
of these save Ockam, is evident from his writings wherein he 
calls upon them to substantiate his arguments. At least in-
directly, Ockam, the father of Nominalism, helped to color 
Suarez's opinions. This can be deduced from the fact that 
he recognized in Biel an authority upon whom he could rely. 
Now Gabriel Biel, the last of the scholastics, in his chief 
work, Collectorium, shows himself a faithful and painstaking 
exponent of the Nominalistic doctrines. Ockam, Biel's master, 
following the lead of Peter Aureolus and Durandus, was the 
single individual who crystallized and most widely propagated 
the philosoph~cal heresy known as Nominalism or Terminism. 
That Suarez saw something good in Nominalism can 
be gathered from one passage of the Disputationes Metaphysicae 
where in speaks in a strain that shows more than a healthy 
·tolerance for the whole system. 
Et merito reprehendendi aunt Nom-
inales quoad loquendi modos, nam 
in re fortasse non dissident a 
vera sententia: nam eorum ratio-
nes hunc solum tendunt, ut ~obent 
universalitatem non esse in rebus, 
sed convenire illis prout in intel-
lectu, seu per denominationem ab 
aliquo opere intellectus, quod verum 
est.2 
~-s~;;;;:·Disputationes Metaphysicae. Disp. VI, Sect. 2, 
No. 1. 
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While the super-tolerance of the first part of the quotation 
might be passed off lightly, one is led to be more than 
amazed upon consideration of the second part. While even 
this may admit favorable interpretation, as it stands it is 
a dangerous and surprising commitment. This passage, along 
with others which can be gathered from his works, adds weight 
to the contention that Suarez was unable to purge his meta-
physics of the bl.ight of Nominalism. With the Nominalists, 
though not necessari1y because of them, he denied the real 
distinction between essence and existence. In accord with 
them and as a direct corollary to this concept of essence 
and existence, Suarez held that prime matter had its own en-
titative a~t, though it had this act with a transcendental 
relation to the substantial form. These Nominalistic ten-
dencies of the great Doctor can be succinctly summarized in 
the following quotation: 
J 
••• Suarez ••• esprit eminent, 
sans conteste ••• vivat, co.mme 
ses con~e~porains, dans une ambi-
ance crei:e )'ar 1' nomina:Usme, ~t 
que, m~lgre sa reaction expresse-
ment real;ste ~n log;que, 11 n'a~­
ait pas reu~sia se degager comple-
tement en metaphysique, d'influences 
qui diminuaient •• d 1 aucuns disent: 
qui faussaient •• d' avance la por-
t'e d'un effort meritoire. Suarez 
en effet, comma Duns Scot, comme 
Occam, pose en th~se la connais-
sance intellectuelle directe du sin-
gulier materiel, 1 1 individuat1on 
I des choses sensibles independen-
damment de leur mati~re 1 1iden-
titlr~elle de 1 1 essenc~ et de 
t•existe~ce dans les ~reatures, 
l'"entite" de le; I?atiere et de 
la forme considerees en elles-
m~mes, etc. ~ • 3 
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Yet again Suarez's whole approach to philosophy 
may be set down as a partial cause for the attitude he took 
towards many problems, including the essence or prime matter. 
In outlook Suarez was intent on satisfying the exigencies not 
only or metaphysics, but also those of the empirical sciences. 
To accomplish this it was necessary to bring under a unified 
system the doctrines or Thomas and Scotus. So preoccupied 
was he with this that he,"avowedly pursues the path or 
balance between Scotism and Thomism".4 By this method he 
hoped to find a common ground for the meeting of philosophy 
and the physical sciences which were beginning to gain popu-
larity in his day. In all this it seems that Suarez failed 
to remember that many metaphysical concep,ts would never 
suffer boiling in a test tube. Prime matter, empirically 
considered, cannot be conceived as an incomplete being which 
has not at least a grain of perfection. Empirically viewed, 
3 J. Marechal, s. J. Le r.int de Depart de la Metaphysique .• 
Paris, Alcan, 1927,-rs • 
4 Erich Przywara, S.J. Polarity. Translated by A.C. Bouquet, 
D.D. Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, London, 
1935, 110. 
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prime matter had to be endowed with same kind of act. In 
other words, Suarez directed all his attention to the singular 
individual and to direct experience, intellectual or sensible, 
which alone could grasp it. This is but the flowering of 
Suarez's first principles. To the end he was a man who follow-
ed the inevitable force of logic to its inevitable conclusion. 
Though brutally logical, such a concept of prime 
matter and its essential composition seems to take the problem 
of change back to where Parmenides found it. Why? As has 
been argued in chapter four of this thesis, entitative act is 
act or it is not. Since there is absolutely no doubt that 
Suarez considers it to be act, prime matter is essentially 
composed. Granted that matter has composition, then two 
problems arise. First, how can matter fUnction as the ul-
'timate substratum of change and still be called first matter? 
Secondly, how can this matter with its entitative act be un-
ited with the substantial form? Suarez offers a solution to 
this latter difficulty by appealing to a mode of union.5 Yet 
this mode does not seem to be a true metaphysical answer to 
the problem. 
~~---~---~ 
~o in casu unio relate ad con-
stitutiva elementa videtur ex-
trinseca: non per se sed per 
aliud efficitur. Praeter unio-
5 suarez. Disputationes MetaRhysicae. Disp. XXXVI, Sect. 3 
No. 8. 
nem ele.menta eoneipi possunt; 
quare aliud est eompositum et 
alia aunt componentia, nisi 
eomponentibus modus addatur.6 
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By means of this mode matter would not only be joined to the 
form "per aliudr but the resultant would be an accidental 
and not an essential composite. The substantial form would 
be something superadded to the matter, and according to St. 
Thomas, ••• "illud quod superadvenit non dat esse actu sim-
pliciter materiae, sed esse actu tale, sieut acctdentia 
faciunt; ••• Unde, quando talia forma acquiritur, non dicitur 
generari simpliciter, sed secundum quid~7 Finally, from this 
it would seem that Suarez is forced to conclude that prime 
matter is an ~ guod or a complete being. 
Suarez vero distinctionem real-
em metaphysieam in ordine essendi 
non applicans, neque in ordine 
quidditatis lllam applicare valet, 
ideoque materiam ut quoddam ens 
tractare cogitur et subject! uni-
tatem servare nequit.S 
In other words it seems that logic would force him to admit 
that, "ex ante non fit ens~ And so the circle is completed 
and Parmenides's problem once more clamors for solution. 
~-~~;~;,;;eker. 315. 
8 St. Thomas. ~~!! Essentia. Chapter 2. DeRaeymaeker. 316. 
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